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Abstract
In the classical model for (information theo-
retically secure) Private Information Retrieval
(PIR) due to Chor, Goldreich, Kushilevitz and
Sudan, a user wishes to retrieve one bit of a
database that is stored on a set of n servers,
in such a way that no individual server gains
information about which bit the user is inter-
ested in. The aim is to design schemes that min-
imise the total communication between the user
and the servers. More recently, there have been
moves to consider more realistic models where
the total storage of the set of servers, or the
per server storage, should be minimised (possibly
using techniques from distributed storage), and
where the database is divided into R-bit records
with R > 1, and the user wishes to retrieve one
record rather than one bit. When R is large,
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downloads from the servers to the user dominate
the communication complexity and so the aim is
to minimise the total number of downloaded bits.
Work of Shah, Rashmi and Ramchandran shows
that at least R + 1 bits must be downloaded
from servers in the worst case, and provides PIR
schemes meeting this bound. Sun and Jafar have
considered the download cost of a scheme, de-
fined as the ratio of the message length R and
the total number of bits downloaded. They de-
termine the best asymptotic download cost of a
PIR scheme (as R → ∞) when a database of k
messages is stored by n servers. This paper pro-
vides various bounds on the download complex-
ity of a PIR scheme, generalising those of Shah
et al. to the case when the number n of servers is
bounded, and providing links with classical tech-
niques due to Chor et al. The paper also provides
a range of constructions for PIR schemes that are
either simpler or perform better than previously
known schemes. These constructions include ex-
plicit schemes that achieve the best asymptotic
download complexity of Sun and Jafar with sig-
nificantly lower upload complexity, and general
techniques for constructing a scheme with good
worst case download complexity from a scheme
with good download complexity on average.
1 Introduction
1.1 The PIR Model
In the classical model for private information re-
trieval (PIR) due to Chor, Goldreich, Kushile-
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vitz and Sudan [14], a database X is replicated
across n servers S1, S2, . . . , Sn. A user wishes
to retrieve one bit of the database, so sends a
query to each server and downloads their reply.
The user should be able to deduce the bit from
the servers’ replies. Moreover, no single server
should gain any information on which bit the
user wishes to retrieve (without collusion). The
resulting protocol is known as an (information-
theoretic) PIR scheme; there are also computa-
tional variants of the security model [30]. The
goal of PIR is to minimise the total communica-
tion between the user and the servers.
In practice, the assumption that the user only
wishes to retrieve one bit of the database, and
the assumption that there is no shortage of server
storage seem unrealistic. Because of this, many
recent papers assume that the database X con-
sists of k records, each of which is R bits in
length, so that the number of possible databases
is 2kR. We denote the value of Record i by Xi,
and we write Xij for the jth bit of Xi. The
aim of the protocol is for the user to retrieve the
whole of Xi, rather than a single bit. We also,
following Shah, Rashmi and Ramchandran [38],
drop the assumption that the whole database
is replicated across the n servers S1, S2, . . . , Sn
and so, for example, there is the possibility of
using techniques from coding theory in general
and from distributed storage codes in particular
to reduce the total storage of the scheme. No
restrictions are made on the particular encod-
ing used to distribute the database across the
servers other than to assume it is determinis-
tic, i.e. that there is a unique way to encode
each database. This important generalisation of
the model has led to very interesting recent work
which we discuss in Subsection 1.3 below. Our
work is a follow-up to [38] with modifications,
improvements, complementary results, simplifi-
cations, constructions, and additional aspects
which were not considered in their paper.
More combinatorially, we define a private in-
formation retrieval scheme as follows.
Definition 1.1 (PIR scheme). Suppose a
database X is distributed across n servers
S1, S2, . . . , Sn. A user who wishes to learn
the value X` of Record ` submits a query
(q1, q2, . . . , qn). For each r ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, server
Sr receives qr and responds with a value cr
that depends on qr and on the information
stored by Sr. The user receives the response
(c1, c2, . . . , cn). This system is a private infor-
mation retrieval (PIR) scheme if the following
two properties are satisfied:
• (Privacy) For r = 1, 2, . . . , n the value qr
received by server Sr reveals no information
about which record is being sought.
• (Correctness) Given a response
(c1, c2, . . . , cn) to a query (q1, q2, . . . , qn) for
Record `, the user is unambiguously able to
recover the value X` of this record.
Note that while the query is drawn randomly
according a pre-specified distribution on a set of
potential queries, the response is assumed to be
deterministic.
Example 1.1. In the case of a single server, a
trivial method for achieving PIR is for the user
to download the entire kR-bit database.
Chor, Goldreich, Kushilevitz and Sudan
showed that in the case of single-bit records
(R = 1), if there is a single server then PIR is
only possible if the total communication is at
least k bits (i.e. the size of the entire database)
[14], and so the solution above is best possible.
We are interested in finding solutions such as the
scheme below, which transmit significantly fewer
than kR bits.
Example 1.2. [14] Suppose there are two
servers, each storing the entire database. Sup-
pose R = 1.
• A user who requires Record ` chooses a k-bit
string (α1, α2, . . . , αk) uniformly at random.
• Server 1 is requested to return the value
c1 =
⊕k
i=1 αiXi, and Server 2 is requested
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to return c2 =
(⊕k
i=1 βiXi
)
, where
βi =
{
αi ⊕ 1 when i = `,
αi otherwise.
• The user computes c1 ⊕ c2 to recover the
value X` of Record `.
The strings (α1, α2, . . . , αk) and
(β1, β2, . . . , βk) are both uniformly distributed,
and are independent of the choice of `, hence
neither server receives any information as to
which record is being recovered by the user.
We note that the scheme above works un-
changed when the records are R-bit strings
rather than single bits. The download complex-
ity of the scheme, in other words the total num-
ber of bits downloaded from the servers, is 2R.
The upload complexity is 2k, since each server
receives a k-bit string from the user. Thus the
total communication of the scheme is 2R + 2k
bits, which is significantly less than kR bits for
most parameters.
Note that the upload complexity of this
scheme does not depend on R, and so is an in-
significant proportion of the total communica-
tion when R is large. This is a general phe-
nomenon: Chan, Ho and Yamamoto [13, Remark
2] observe the following. Let m > 1 be an inte-
ger. Suppose we have an n-server PIR scheme
for a database of k records, each R bits long.
Suppose the scheme requires u upload bits and
d download bits. Then we can construct an n-
server PIR scheme for a database of k records,
each mR bits long, which requires md bits of
download but still needs just u bits to be up-
loaded. Note that when m is large (so records
are long) the communication complexity of the
new scheme is dominated by the download com-
plexity of the given scheme.
Because of the observation of Chan et al., it
is vital to find PIR schemes with low download
complexity. We formalise the download com-
plexity as follows.
Definition 1.2. A PIR scheme uses binary
channels if the response cj sent by server Sj is
a binary string of length dj , where dj depends
only on the query qj it receives. The download
complexity is the maximum of the sum
∑n
j=1 dj
over all possible queries (q1, q2, . . . , qn).
So the download complexity is the number of
bits downloaded in the worst case. We empha-
sise that the length dj in the definition above
does not depend on the database X, but could
depend on the query qj received by server Sj . We
note that we allow for the possibility that dj = 0,
so the server does not reply to the query. Finally,
we note that if we know that there are more than
2x distinct possibilities for cj as the database
varies, we may deduce that dj ≥ x+1. Although
it is possible to use non-binary channels for PIR
as was done recently (see Subsection 1.3), we re-
strict our exposition to PIR schemes using binary
channels in this paper. Most schemes in the lit-
erature before the work of [38] implicitly use this
model, as they use fields of characteristic 2 and
transmit strings of bits. This restricted model
is implicit also in Shah et al. [38] when a lower
bound on the download complexity is proved.
This model is only required for those results in
Section 2 paper that are used to generalise their
bound. Although most results in the other sec-
tions can be generalised for the non-binary case
we prefer not to do so for simplicity.
We should comment that, despite the observa-
tion of Chan et al., we should not ignore upload
complexity completely, as there are scenarios (for
example, when R is not so large) when it might
be dominant. Moreover, we cannot compare the
difficulty of uploading 2k bits with download-
ing 2R bits just by comparing k and R, since we
know (at least currently) that in practice it takes
much more time to upload a bit than to down-
load one. Of course, we don’t know how the
speed of downloading and uploading will change
over time. But the obvious consequence of the
current situation and future developments is to
consider both upload and download complexities
separately, and not to ignore one of them com-
pletely. This is something that will be done in
this paper, although the download complexity
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will be the main target for optimisation since we
generally assume that the size of the database
is (considerably) larger than the one bit of the
classical PIR model.
We continue to another important measure
that has motivated many papers in the last three
years, after being introduced by Shah et al. [38]:
Definition 1.3. Suppose server Sr stores sr bits
of information about the database X.
• The per-server storage of the scheme is
max{sr | r = 1, 2, . . . , n}.
• The total storage of the scheme is ∑nr=1 sr.
• The storage overhead of the scheme is the
ratio between the total storage and the total
size of the records in the database, i.e. kR.
The classical model of PIR ignored storage is-
sues: it was assumed that there is enough storage
to allow the replication of the database at each
server. But, with the quantity of information
stored today in data centres, storage is an issue
today and might be an important barrier in the
future. Thus, it is important to reduce the stor-
age overhead as much as possible, while keeping
reliability, fast access, fast upload and fast down-
load at reasonable levels. This is the perspective
of the current paper, which is concerned with
schemes whose download complexity is as small
as possible whilst keeping the total storage at
reasonable levels.
Finally, it should be noted that although most
of the work in this area is theoretical, there have
been notable recent advances in bridging the gap
between theory and practice, e.g. [24, 54] as we
highlight in Subsection 1.3.
1.2 Our contributions
In Section 2, we provide combinatorial results on
the structure of a PIR scheme with small down-
load complexity:
• We generalise (Theorem 2.2) a key theo-
rem in the foundational paper of Chor et
al. [14], and use this result to generalise the
lower bound of R + 1 on download com-
plexity in [38]. The results imply (Theo-
rem 2.5) that an n-server PIR scheme must
have download complexity at least nn−1R
when k > dR/(n−1)e. (This last result can
also be obtained as a corollary of a recent
bound due to Sun and Jafar [39].) These
results provide a bridge between classical
PIR and the new models that are assum-
ing the retrieval of long records. Moreover
(as often happens with a combinatorial ap-
proach), some extra structural information
on schemes is provided: see Theorem 2.3.
• We provide (Corollary 2.6, Theorem 2.7) in-
formation on the structure of a PIR scheme
with minimal download complexity R+1. In
particular, Theorem 2.7 provides a rigorous
statement of [38, Theorem 1].
In Section 3, we provide various constructions
for PIR schemes with low download complexity:
• In Subsection 3.1, we provide two simple
(R + 1)-server PIR schemes with download
complexity R + 1. Both schemes have to-
tal storage which is quadratic in R. The
first scheme is a natural generalisation of
the scheme of Chor et al. given above. The
second scheme is a close variant of the
quadratic total storage PIR scheme in [38],
which avoids having to design slightly differ-
ent schemes depending on the parity of R.
This second scheme is to be preferred due to
its lower upload complexity. (Another, more
complex, PIR scheme with download com-
plexity R+ 1 is considered in detail in [38].
This scheme has small per-server storage,
but requires an exponential (in R) number
of servers, and so has exponential total stor-
age.)
• In Subsection 3.2, we describe an n-server
PIR scheme with download complexity
n
n−1R. The total storage of the scheme is
linear in R. This shows that for any  > 0
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there exists a PIR scheme with linear total
storage and download complexity at most
(1 + )R. (Schemes with linear total stor-
age, but with download complexity between
2R and 4R, are given in [38].)
• We describe (Subsection 3.3) schemes that
provide trade-offs between increasing the
number of servers and reducing the per-
server storage of the scheme in Subsec-
tion 3.2.
• In Subsection 3.4, we provide explicit
schemes that achieve optimal asymptotic
download cost. The performance of these
schemes is equal to the inductively defined
schemes in Sun and Jafar [39], but the de-
scription of these schemes is more concise,
and the proof that they are indeed PIR
schemes is much more straightforward.
• Finally, in Subsection 3.5, we explain an av-
eraging technique that allows a PIR scheme
with good average download complexity to
be transformed into a scheme with good
download complexity in the worst case.
1.3 Context
We end this introduction with a discussion of
some of the related literature. (Many of these
papers appeared after the conference version of
our paper [11] was posted. We omit results sub-
mitted after our submission of this paper.)
Private information retrieval was introduced
in [14], and has been an active area ever since.
See, for example, Yekhanin [55] for a fairly recent
survey.
The papers by Shah et al. [38] and (indepen-
dently) by Augot, Levy-Dit-Vahel, and Shikfa [3]
are the first to consider PIR models where
the information stored in the servers could be
coded using techniques from distributed stor-
age. Whereas [38] is mainly concerned with
download complexity, and also with total storage
(with per-server storage, and query size also rel-
evant parameters), the authors of [3] emphasise
measures of robustness against malicious servers,
namely decoder locality and PIR locality.
More recently, the literature has addressed
several parallel and related issues, which can be
categorised as follows:
1. Papers dealing with the download complex-
ity, rate, and capacity of PIR schemes.
2. Research which attempts to reduce the stor-
age overhead of PIR schemes.
3. Papers which present coding techniques,
based on various error-correcting codes, e.g.
MDS codes, to store the database in a dis-
tributed fashion.
4. Papers which consider PIR schemes in the
presence of unreliable servers. Servers might
be colluding (so they have access to more
than one query qr), they might fail (and so
do not reply with a value cr), they might be
adversarial (replying with incorrect values
cr), they might be unsynchronised (storing
slightly different copies of the database) and
so on.
5. Research which aims to build PIR schemes
into previously known architectures for dis-
tributed storage.
6. Papers dealing with other PIR models, for
example allowing broadcasting of some in-
formation, or allowing the user to possess
side information such as the value of some
records.
Clearly, these issues are related, and a given pa-
per might address aspects of more than one of
these topics.
In early papers, Fanti and Ramchandran [17,
18] considered unsynchronized databases; the re-
sults are the same as for synchronized PIR at the
expense of probabilistic success for information
retrieval, and the use of two rounds of communi-
cation. We are not aware of recent work in this
model, but we mention in this context the work
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of Tajeddine and El Rouayheb [47] which consid-
ers PIR schemes in the presence of some servers
which do not respond to a query.
In a sequence of papers, Sun and Jafar [39, 41,
43, 44, 45] consider the capacity of the channels
related to PIR codes in various models. (The
rate of a PIR scheme is the ratio of R and the
download complexity, and the capacity is the
supremum of achievable rates.) In the model
for PIR we consider, they use information the-
oretic techniques to show [39] that an n-server
PIR scheme on a k message database has rate at
most (
1− 1
n
)(
1−
(
1
n
)k)−1
.
Their model is restricted to the special case of
replication. They also provide a scheme that at-
tains this rate. The messages in their scheme are
extremely long for most values of n and k: the
message length must be a multiple of nk. Be-
cause of this, the scheme can be thought of as
being tailored for the situation when R → ∞.
Their results show that when R → ∞ with n
and k fixed, there are schemes whose download
complexity (and so whose communication com-
plexity) has a leading term of the form
n
n− 1
(
1−
(
1
n
)k)
R,
and that this term is best possible. (We give an
explicit scheme with the same download com-
plexity in Subsection 3.4.)
The results in [39] have been generalised to
the case when some of the servers collude. Sun
and Jafar [43] find the capacity of the channel
in this more general case. (The results in [39]
can be thought of as the special case where each
server can collude only with itself.) The capac-
ity for the symmetric PIR model, where the user
who retrieves a message will get no information
about the other messages in the database, is de-
termined in [45]. The optimal download com-
plexity in the situation when the messages in the
database might be of an arbitrary length (sub-
ject to a certain divisibility condition with all
messages having the same length) is considered
in [41]. The most recent in this sequence of pa-
pers considers an interactive model, where a user
can have several rounds of queries, the queries
in a given round are allowed to depend on an-
swers from previous rounds. Moreover, collud-
ing servers are considered in this model. It is
proved [44] that for this case there is no change
in the capacity, but that the storage overhead
can sometimes be improved.
Banawan and Ulukus [5] also generalise the
results of Sun and Jafar [39], finding the exact
capacity of the PIR scheme when the database is
encoded with a linear code. Another generalisa-
tion due to Banawan and Ulukus [4, 6] is to the
scenario that the user is allowed to request a few
records in one round of queries. They provide
capacity computations and schemes for this sce-
nario. A similar case was also discussed in [59].
Finally, Banawan and Ulukus [7] consider the
capacity of PIR schemes in the scenario where
servers might not be synchronised, there might
be adversarial errors, and some servers might col-
lude. They compute the capacity when some
or all of these events might occur. Wang and
Skoglund [51] consider the capacity of a sym-
metric PIR scheme when the database is stored
in a distributed fashion using an MDS code.
Chan, Ho, and Yamamoto [12, 13] consider the
trade-off between the total storage and the down-
load complexity when the size of a record is large;
the trade-off depends on the number of records
in the system. They also consider the case where
the database is encoded with an MDS code.
Fazeli, Vardy, and Yaakobi [19, 20] give a
method to reduce the storage overhead based
on any known PIR scheme which uses replica-
tion. Their method reduces the storage over-
head considerably, without affecting the order
of the download complexity or upload complex-
ity of the overall scheme, by simulating the
original scheme on a larger number of servers.
Their key concept is an object they call a κ-
PIR code (more generally a κ-PIR array code),
where κ is the number of servers used in the orig-
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inally known PIR scheme, which controls how a
database can be divided into parts and encoded
within servers to allow a trade-off between the
number of servers and the storage overhead. In
particular, for all  > 0, they show that there
exist good schemes (in terms of communication
requirements) where the amount of information
stored in a server is bounded but the total stor-
age is at most (1+) times the database size. Rao
and Vardy [32] study PIR codes further, estab-
lishing the asymptotic behavior of κ-PIR codes.
Vajha, Ramkumar, and Kumar [50] find the re-
dundancy of such codes for κ = 3, 4 by using
Reed-Muller codes. Lin and Rosnes [31] show
how to shorten and lengthen PIR codes, and
find the redundancy of such codes for κ = 5, 6.
Blackburn and Etzion [9, 10] consider the opti-
mal ratios between κ-PIR array codes and the
actual number of servers used in the system.
Zhang, Wang, Wei, and Ge [58] consider these
ratios further, and improve some of the results
from [9, 10]. We remark that though it is pos-
sible to reduce the storage overhead using the
techniques of PIR array codes, it seems impos-
sible to reduce the download complexity of the
resulting schemes below (3/2)R (and most codes
give download complexity close to 2R) because
of restrictions on the PIR rate of such codes. It is
interesting to note that Augot, Levy-Dit-Vahel,
and Shikfa [3] constructed PIR schemes by parti-
tioning the database into smaller parts, as done
later in [19, 20], to reduce the storage overhead.
But they applied this technique only to a certain
family of multiplicity codes, and the parts of the
partition were not encoded as in [19, 20].
Fazeli, Vardy, and Yaakobi [20] remark that
the concept of a κ-PIR code is closely related to
codes with locality and availability. Such codes
were studied first by Rawat, Papailiopoulos, Di-
makis, and Vishwanath [33, 34] and later also
by others, for example [21, 25]. A new sub-
space approach for such codes was given recently
in [36, 37]. Another family of related codes with
similar properties are batch codes, which were
first defined by Ishai, Kushilevitz, Ostrovsky,
and Sahai [26] and were recently studied by many
others, for example [1, 2, 35]. It is important
to note that all these codes are very important
in the theory of distributed storage codes. This
connection between the concepts of locality and
PIR codes are explored in [21].
Error-correcting codes, and in particular max-
imum distance separable (MDS) codes, have
been considered by many authors in various
PIR models. It is natural to consider MDS
codes, as they are very often used in various
types of distributed storage codes (especially for
locally repairable codes [23] and regenerating
codes [15, 16]), and we expect that the servers
in our PIR scheme will be part of a distributed
storage system. We will now mention various
examples.
Colluding or malicious servers in PIR have
been much studied over the last two years.
Tajeddine and El Rouayheb [46] consider PIR
schemes where the information is stored using
MDS codes. Their PIR scheme based on the
coded MDS achieves a retrieval rate 1−R, where
R is the code rate of the storage system. They
attain the bounds for linear schemes in [12, 13],
in the situation when one or two ‘spies’ (collud-
ing and/or malicious servers) are present. In the
case of one spy (no collusion) a generalisation
to any linear code with rate greater than half
was given in [29]. Freij-Hollanti, Gnilke, Hol-
lanti, and Karpuk [22] give a PIR scheme coded
with an MDS code which can be adjusted (by
varying the rate of the MDS code) to combat
against larger numbers of colluding servers. This
scheme also attains the asymptotic bound on the
related capacity of such a PIR scheme in the ex-
treme cases, where there are no colluding servers
or when the database is replicated, i.e. no coding
is applied. This idea is generalised in [48]. The
results in the latter paper are analysed (and one
conjecture disproved) by Sun and Jafar [40, 42].
Another scheme based on MDS codes which can
combat large number of colluding servers is given
by Zhang and Ge [56]. A generalisation to the
case where the user wants to retrieve several files
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is given by the same authors in [57]. Wang and
Skoglund [52] consider a symmetric PIR scheme
using an MDS code, in which the user can re-
trieve the information about the file he wants,
but can gain no information about the other files.
This scheme attains the bound on the capac-
ity which they derive earlier in [51]. They have
extended their work to accommodate colluding
servers in [53].
PIR can be combined with other applications
in storage and communication in many ways.
One example is a related broadcasting scheme
in [28]. Another example is cache-aided PIR,
considered by Tandon [49]. In this setup the
user is equipped with a local cache which is
formed from an arbitrary function on the whole
set of messages, and this local cache is known
to the servers. The situation when this cache
is not known to the servers is considered by
Kadhe, Garcia, Heidarzadeh, El Rouayheb, and
Sprintson [27]. Since the user has side informa-
tion in these models, the problem is closely re-
lated to index coding [8] a topic which is also of
great interest.
While most of the work in this area is theoret-
ical, there have been notable recent advances in
bridging the gap between theory and practice.
For example, the recent paper [24] reports on
the design and implementation of a scalable and
private media delivery system — called Popcorn
— that explicitly targets Netflix-like content dis-
tribution. Another practical system for private
queries on public datasets — called Splinter —
is currently in development [54]. This system
has been reported to achieve latencies below 1.20
seconds for realistic workloads including a Yelp
clone, flight search, and map routing.
2 Optimal download complex-
ity
In this section, we give structural results for
PIR schemes with optimal download complex-
ity, given that the database consists of k records
of length R. For some of the results, we also
assume that the PIR scheme involves n servers,
where n is fixed.
In Subsection 2.1 we generalise a classical re-
sult in Private Information Retrieval due to Chor
et al. We use this result to provide an alterna-
tive proof of the theorem of Shah, Rashmi and
Ramchandran [38] that a PIR scheme must have
download complexity at least R+ 1 when k ≥ 2,
and to prove a lower bound of nn−1R for the
download complexity of an n-server PIR scheme
whenever k is sufficiently large. In Section 2.2 we
present more precise structural results when the
download complexity of a PIR scheme attains
the optimal value of R+ 1 bits.
Definition 2.1. We say that a response
(c1, c2, . . . , cn) is possible for a query
(q1, q2, . . . , qn) if there exists a database X
for which (c1, c2, . . . , cn) is returned as the
response to the query (q1, q2, . . . , qn) when X is
stored by the servers.
2.1 Lower bounds on the download
complexity
We aim to generalise the following theorem,
which was proved by Chor et al. in the very first
paper on PIR [14, Theorem 5.1]:
Theorem 2.1. A PIR scheme that uses a single
server for a database with k records of size one
bit is not possible unless the number of possible
responses from the server to any given query is
at least 2k.
Our generalisation shows a server must reply
with at least k(R − d) bits of download, if no
more than a total of d bits (where 0 ≤ d ≤ R) are
downloaded from the other servers. We state our
generalisation as follows. Without loss of gener-
ality we will focus on server S1, so for ease of
notation we will denote the tuple (q1, q2, . . . , qn)
by (q1, qother), and (c1, c2, . . . , cn) by (c1, cother).
Theorem 2.2. Suppose 0 ≤ d ≤ R. Let
q1 be fixed. Suppose we have a PIR scheme
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with the property that for any query of the form
(q1, qother), we have
|{cother | ∃c1 such that (c1, cother) is possible
for (q1, qother)}| ≤ 2d.
Then for any query (q1, q
′
other) we have
|{c1 | ∃cother such that (c1, cother) is possible
for (q1, q
′
other)}| ≥ 2k(R−d).
We remark that Theorem 2.1 is the case d = 0
and R = 1 of Theorem 2.2.
Proof. Let q1 be fixed, and suppose we have a
PIR scheme with the property that for any query
(q1, qother)
|{cother | ∃c1 such that (c1, cother) is possible
for (q1, qother)}| ≤ 2d.
(1)
Assume, for a contradiction, that there exists a
query (q1, q
∗
other) for which
|{c1 | ∃cother such that (c1, cother) is possible
for (q1, q
∗
other)}| < 2k(R−d).
Suppose this query is for Record i.
Let c∗1 be a most common reply of S1 to
(q1, q
∗
other) as the database varies over all possi-
bilities. So we choose c∗1 to maximise |T |, where
T is the set of databases where S1 replies with
c∗1 to the query (q1, q∗other). If server S1 receives
the query q1, it will thus return c
∗
1 whenever a
database in T is being stored. There are 2kR
databases, and less than 2k(R−d) possibilities for
the reply c1 of S1 to the query (q1, q
∗
other). So by
the pigeonhole principle, |T | > 2kR/2k(R−d) =
2kd.
Since the databases consist of k records, the
fact that |T | > 2kd implies the existence of
a record, say Record `, for which the number
of distinct values X` that appear among the
databases in T is greater than 2d. Thus we can
choose a subset of 2d + 1 databases W ⊆ T such
that the values X` of Record ` in the databases
in W are all distinct.
The requirement for privacy against server S1
implies that there exists a query for Record ` of
the form (q1, q
`
other), since otherwise S1 could dis-
tinguish between queries for Record i and Record
`.
Suppose the query (q1, q
`
other) for Record ` is
made, and suppose that the database lies in W .
Server S1 receives q1, and so (since W ⊆ T )
replies with c∗1. But there are at most 2d possible
replies c`other from the remaining servers by (1),
and so there are at most 2d responses (c∗1, c`other)
to the query (q1, q
`
other). Since |W | = 2d + 1,
there are two databases X,Y ∈ W such that
the servers respond identically. But this is our
required contradiction, since X and Y have dis-
tinct values for Record ` and the query was for
this record.
The following theorem is a key consequence of
Theorem 2.2.
Theorem 2.3. Let x be non-negative, and sup-
pose we have a PIR scheme that has download
complexity at most R + x. If the database con-
tains k records, where k ≥ x+2, then the number
of bits downloaded from any server is at most x.
Proof. Without loss of generality, consider the
server S1. Suppose for a contradiction that
there exists a query q1 so that at least x + 1
bits are downloaded from S1 (and so at most
(R + x) − (x + 1) = R − 1 bits are down-
loaded from the other servers). Suppose that
a total of d bits are downloaded from the other
servers in the worst case when S1 receives q1. So
d ≤ R − 1. Theorem 2.2 implies that at least
k(R− d) bits are downloaded from S1, and so at
least k(R− d) + d bits are downloaded from the
servers in the worst case. But d ≤ R − 1 and
k ≥ x+ 2, so
k(R− d) + d = kR− (k − 1)d
≥ kR− (k − 1)(R− 1)
= R+ k − 1 ≥ R+ (x+ 2)− 1
= R+ x+ 1,
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which is impossible as the scheme has total
download complexity R + x. This contradiction
establishes the theorem.
We are now in a position to provide a new
short proof of the following corollary. The corol-
lary is due to Shah et al. [38].
Corollary 2.4. Let the database contain k
records with k ≥ 2. Any PIR scheme requires
a total download of at least R+ 1 bits.
Proof. Suppose we have a scheme with total
download of R or fewer bits. Theorem 2.3 with
x = 0 implies that 0 bits are downloaded from
each server, and so the user receives no infor-
mation about the desired record. Hence such a
scheme cannot exist.
The following theorem (which can also be de-
rived from the results in [39]), improves the
bound of Corollary 2.4 when n < R+ 1 and k is
sufficiently large.
Theorem 2.5. Suppose a PIR scheme involves
n servers, where n ≥ 2. Suppose the database
contains k records, where k ≥ d 1n−1Re+ 1. Then
the download complexity of the scheme is at least
n
n−1R bits.
Proof. Assume for a contradiction that the
scheme has download complexity R + x, where
x is an integer such that x < 1n−1R. Since
x ≤ d 1n−1Re − 1, we see that k ≥ x + 2 and
so Theorem 2.3 implies that the number of bits
downloaded by any server is at most x. Since we
have n servers, the total number of bits of down-
load is always at most xn. Since our scheme
has download complexity R+x, there is a query
where a total of R+ x bits are downloaded from
servers. Hence we must have that nx ≥ R + x,
which implies that x ≥ 1n−1R. This contradic-
tion establishes the result.
2.2 Download complexity R + 1
The final two results of this section concentrate
on the extreme case when the download complex-
ity is exactly R + 1. Recall that the download
complexity is a worst case measure: every query
results in at most R + 1 bits being downloaded,
and there exists a query where R + 1 bits are
downloaded.
Corollary 2.6. Let the database contain k
records with k ≥ 3. Any PIR scheme with a total
download of exactly R + 1 bits requires 1 bit to
be downloaded from each of R or R+ 1 different
servers in response to any query.
Proof. The special case of Theorem 2.3 when
x = 1 shows that no server replies with more
than 1 bit. For the download complexity to be
R + 1, no more than R + 1 servers can respond
non-trivially. Since the user deduces the value of
an R-bit record from the bits it has downloaded,
at least R servers must reply to any query.
One might hope that the Corollary 2.6 could
be strengthened to the statement that exactly
R + 1 servers must respond non-trivially. How-
ever, examples show that this is not always the
case: see the comments after Construction 1 be-
low.
Shah et al. state [38, Theorem 1] that, in the
situation above, “for almost every PIR opera-
tion” R+ 1 servers must respond, and they pro-
vide a heuristic argument to support this state-
ment. The following result makes this rigorous,
with a precise definition of ‘almost every’.
Theorem 2.7. Let the database contain k
records with k ≥ 3. Suppose we have a PIR
scheme with a total download of exactly R+1 bits
(in the worst case). Suppose a user chooses to re-
trieve a record chosen with a uniform probability
distribution on {1, 2, . . . , k}. Let α be the proba-
bility that only R bits are downloaded. Then
α ≤ R+ 1
kR+ 1
.
Proof. By Corollary 2.6, each server replies to
any query with at most one bit. We may assume,
without loss of generality, that if a server replies
with one bit then this bit must depend on the
database in some way (since otherwise we may
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modify the scheme so that this server does not
reply and the probability α will increase).
Let (q1, q2, . . . , qn) be a query for the `th
record where only R servers reply non-trivially.
Since only R servers reply, there are at most 2R
possible replies to the query (over all databases).
But the value X` of the record is determined by
the reply, and there are 2R possible values of
X`. So in fact there must be exactly 2
R possible
replies, and there is a bijection between possible
replies and possible values X`. We claim that
the replies of each of these R servers can only de-
pend on X`, not on the rest of the database. To
see this, suppose a server Sr replies non-trivially,
and let f : {0, 1}kR → {0, 1} be the function
mapping each possible value of the database to
the reply of Sr to query qr. Suppose f is not a
function of X` alone, so there are two databases
X and X′ whose `th records are equal and such
that f(X) 6= f(X′). Let ρ be the common value
of the `th record in both X and X′. When
X` = ρ there are at least two possible replies
to the query, depending on the value of the re-
mainder of the database. But this contradicts
the fact that we have a bijection between possi-
ble replies and possible values X`. So our claim
follows.
Let A be the event that exactly R servers re-
ply, and for r = 1, 2, . . . , n let Br be the event
that server Sr replies non-trivially. Let Dr be the
indicator random variable for the event Br. So
Dr is equal to 1 when Sr responds non-trivially
and 0 otherwise. Note that Dr is always equal
to the number of bits downloaded from Sr, thus
the expected value of the sum of these variables
satisfies
E
(
n∑
r=1
Dr
)
= αR+ (1−α)(R+ 1) = R+ 1−α.
(2)
Let D′r be the indicator random variable for the
event A ∧ Br. When A does not occur, all the
variables D′r are equal to 0. When A occurs, D′r
is the number of bits downloaded from server Sr
and a total of R bits are downloaded. So
E
(
n∑
r=1
D′r
)
= (1− α)0 + αR = αR. (3)
Suppose a server Sr uses the following strat-
egy to guess the value of ` from the query qr it
receives. If the server replies non-trivially using
a function f that depends on only one record,
say Record `′, it guesses that ` = `′. Otherwise,
the server guesses a value uniformly at random.
The server guesses correctly with probability 1/k
when it responds trivially. The argument in the
paragraph above shows the server always guesses
correctly if it responds non-trivially and only R
servers reply. Thus the server is correct with
probability at least (1/k) Pr(Br) + Pr(A ∧ Br).
The privacy requirement of the PIR scheme im-
plies that the server’s probability of success can
be at most 1/k, and so we must have that
Pr(A ∧Br) ≤ (1/k) Pr(Br). Hence
E(D′r) ≤ (1/k)E(Dr).
By linearity of expectation, we see that
E
(
n∑
r=1
D′r
)
=
n∑
r=1
E(D′r)
≤ 1
k
n∑
r=1
E(Dr) =
1
k
E
(
n∑
r=1
Dr
)
.
So, using (2) and (3), we see that
αR ≤ 1
k
(R+ 1− α).
Rearranging this inequality in terms of α, we see
that the theorem follows.
3 Constructions
Recall the notation from the introduction: we
are assuming that our database X consists of k
records, each of R bits, and we write Xij for the
jth bit of the ith record.
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3.1 Two schemes with download com-
plexity R + 1
This section describes two schemes with down-
load complexity R+1. Recall that this download
complexity is optimal, by Corollary 2.4. The
first scheme is included because of its simplic-
ity; it can be thought of as a variation of the
scheme of Chor et al. described in Example 1.2,
and achieves optimal download complexity us-
ing only R + 1 servers. It has a total storage
requirement which is quadratic in R. But the
scheme has high upload complexity: kR(R+ 1).
The second scheme is very closely related to a
scheme mentioned in an aside in Shah et al. [38,
Section IV]. This scheme has the same properties
as the first scheme, except the upload complexity
is improved to just (R+ 1)kdlog(R+ 1)e.
We note that the main scheme described in
Shah et al. [38, Section IV] also has optimal
download complexity of R+1. Each server stores
just R bits, and so the storage per server is low.
However, their scheme uses an exponential (in R)
number of servers, and so has exponential total
storage.
Construction 1. Suppose there are R + 1
servers, each storing the whole database.
• A user who requires Record ` creates a k ×
R array of bits by drawing its entries αij
uniformly and independently at random.
• Server SR+1 is requested to return the bit
cR+1 =
⊕k
i=1
⊕R
j=1 αijXij.
• For r = 1, 2, . . . , R, server Sr is requested
to return the bit cr =
⊕k
i=1
⊕R
j=1 βijXij,
where
βij =
{
αij ⊕ 1 if i = ` and j = r,
αi,j otherwise.
• To recover X`r, namely bit r of record X`,
the user computes cr ⊕ cR+1.
Theorem 3.1. Construction 1 is a (R + 1)-
server PIR scheme with download complexity R+
1. The scheme has upload complexity kR(R+ 1)
and total storage (R+ 1)Rk bits.
Proof. We note that
αij ⊕ βij =
{
1 if i = ` and j = r,
0 otherwise.
Hence
cr ⊕ cR+1 =
k⊕
i=1
R⊕
j=1
(αij ⊕ βij)Xij
= X`r.
So the user recovers the bit X`r correctly for any
r with 1 ≤ r ≤ R. This proves correctness.
For privacy, we note that SR+1 receives a
uniformly distributed vector qR+1 = (αij) ∈
{0, 1}kR in all circumstances. Since the distribu-
tion of qR+1 does not depend on `, no informa-
tion about ` is received by SR+1. Similarly, for
any 1 ≤ r ≤ R, the query qr = (βij) ∈ {0, 1}kR
is uniformly distributed irrespective of the value
of `, and so no information about ` is received
by Sr.
We note that each query qr is kR bits long (for
any r ∈ {1, 2, . . . , R+1}) and so the upload com-
plexity of the scheme is kR(R + 1). Each server
replies with a single bit, and so the download
complexity is R + 1. The database is kR bits
long, and so (since each server stores the whole
database) the total storage is (R+1)Rk bits.
We note that there are situations where one
of the servers is asked for an all-zero linear com-
bination of bits from the database. In this case,
that server need not reply. So the number of bits
of downloaded in Construction 1 is sometimes R
(though usually R+ 1 bits are downloaded). See
the comment following Corollary 2.6.
We now describe a second construction with
improved upload complexity. The construction
can be thought of as a variant of Construction 1
where the rows of the array α are all taken from
a restricted set {e0, e1, . . . , eR} of size R + 1. A
similar idea is used in the constructions in [38].
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For i = 1, 2, . . . , R, let ei be the i
th unit vector
of length R. Let e0 be the all zero vector. For
binary vectors x and y of length R, write x · y
be their inner product; so x · y = ⊕Rj=1xjyj .
Construction 2. Suppose there are R + 1
servers, each storing the whole database.
• A user who requires Record ` chooses k
elements a1, a2, . . . , ak ∈ ZR+1 uniformly
and independently at random. For r =
1, . . . , R + 1, server Sr is sent the vector
qr = (b1r, b2r, . . . , bkr) ∈ ZkR+1, where
bir =
{
ai + r mod R+ 1 if i = `,
ai otherwise.
• Server Sr returns the bit cr =
⊕k
i=1 ebir ·Xi.
• To recover the jth bit of X`, the user finds
the integers r and r′ such that b`r = 0 and
b`r′ = j. The user then computes cr ⊕ cr′.
Theorem 3.2. Construction 2 is an (R + 1)-
server PIR scheme with download complexity
R+ 1. The scheme has upload complexity k(R+
1) log(R+ 1) and total storage (R+ 1)Rk bits.
Proof. For correctness, we first note that r and
r′ exist since b`r ∈ {0, 1, 2 . . . , R} takes on each
possible value once as r ∈ {0, 1, . . . , R} varies.
Also note that
ebir ⊕ ebir′ =
{
ej if i = `,
e0 otherwise.
So, since e0 = 0,
cr ⊕ cr′ =
k⊕
i=1
(ebir ⊕ ebir′ ) ·Xi = ej ·X` = X`j .
So the user recovers the bit X`j correctly for any
j with 1 ≤ j ≤ R.
For privacy, we note that Sr receives a uni-
formly distributed vector qr ∈ (ZR+1)k in all cir-
cumstances. Since the distribution of qr does not
depend on `, no information about ` is received
by Sr.
The calculations of the total storage and
download complexity are identical to those in
the proof of Theorem 3.1. For the upload com-
plexity, note that it takes just log(R+ 1) bits to
specify an element of ZR+1. Since each server
receives k elements from ZR+1, and since there
are R + 1 servers, the upload complexity of the
scheme is k(R+ 1) log(R+ 1) as claimed.
3.2 Optimal download complexity for
a small number of servers
For an integer n such that (n − 1) | R, we now
describe an n-server PIR scheme with download
complexity nn−1R bits. By Theorem 2.5, this
construction provides schemes with an optimal
download complexity for n servers, provided the
number k of records is sufficiently large. This
construction is closely related to Construction 2
above. Indeed, the construction below is a gen-
eralisation of Construction 2 where we work with
strings rather than single bits.
We first define an analogue of the bits eb ·Xi
computed by servers in Construction 2. We di-
vide an R-bit string X into n − 1 blocks, each
of size R/(n − 1). For b ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n− 1} we
write pib(X) for the bth block (so pib(X) is an
R/(n − 1)-bit string). We write pi0(X) for the
all-zero string 0R/(n−1) of length R/(n− 1).
Construction 3. Let n be an integer such that
(n − 1) | R. Suppose there are n servers, each
storing the entire database.
• A user who requires Record ` chooses k
elements a1, a2, . . . , ak ∈ Zn uniformly
and independently at random. For r =
1, . . . , n, server Sr is sent the vector qr =
(b1r, b2r, . . . , bkr) ∈ Zkn, where
bir =
{
ai + r mod n if i = `,
ai otherwise.
• Server Sr returns the R/(n − 1)-bit string
cr =
⊕k
i=1 pibir(Xi).
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• To recover the jth block of X`, the user finds
the integers r and r′ such that b`r = 0 and
b`r′ = j. The user then computes cr ⊕ cr′.
Theorem 3.3. Construction 3 is an n-server
PIR scheme with download complexity nn−1R.
The scheme has upload complexity nk log n and
total storage is nkR.
Proof. Exactly as in the proof of Theorem 3.2,
we first note that r and r′ exist since b`r ∈
{0, 1, 2 . . . , n − 1} takes on each possible value
once as r ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n} varies. Also note that
when i 6= `
pibir(Xi)⊕pibir′ (Xi) = piai(Xi)⊕piai(Xi) = 0R/(n−1),
but when i = `
pibir(Xi)⊕ pibir′ (Xi) = pi0(Xi)⊕ pij(Xi)
= pij(Xi) = pij(X`).
Hence
cr ⊕ cr′ =
k⊕
i=1
(pibir(Xi)⊕ pibir′ (Xi)) = pij(X`).
So the user recovers the jth block of X` correctly
for any j with 1 ≤ j ≤ (n− 1).
For privacy, we note that Sr receives a uni-
formly distributed vector qr ∈ (Zn)k in all cir-
cumstances. Since the distribution of qr does not
depend on `, no information about ` is received
by Sr.
The total storage is nkR, since each of n
servers stores the entire kR-bit database. Each
query qr is k log n bits long, since an element of
Zn may be specified using log n bits. Hence the
upload complexity is nk log n. Since each server
returns an R/(n − 1)- bit string, the download
complexity is nn−1R.
Shah et al. [38, Section V] provide PIR
schemes with linear (in R) total storage and with
download complexity between 2R and 4R. Their
scheme requires a number of servers which is in-
dependent of R (but is linear in k). The con-
struction above shows that for any fixed positive
 a PIR scheme with linear total storage exists
with download complexity of (1+)R (as we just
fix a value of n such that n/(n−1) < 1+). This
is within an arbitrarily close factor of optimality.
Moreover, the number of servers in our construc-
tion is independent of both k and R. However,
note that in our scheme each server stores the
whole database, whereas the per server storage
of the scheme of Shah et al. is a fixed multiple
of R. This issue is addressed in Construction 4
below.
3.3 Schemes with small per-server
storage
We make the observation that the last construc-
tion may be used to give families of schemes with
lower per-server storage; see [38, Section V] for
similar techniques. The point here is that we
never XOR the first bit (say) from one block with
the second bit (say) of any other block, so we can
store these bits in separate servers without caus-
ing problems.
More precisely, let s be a fixed integer such
that s | R and let t be a fixed integer such that
(t − 1) | s. We divide each record Xi into R/s
blocks pi1(Xi), pi2(Xi), . . . , piR/s(Xi), each s bits
long. We then divide each block pij(Xi) into (t−
1) sub-blocks pij,1(Xi), pij,2(Xi), . . . , pij,t−1(Xi),
each s/(t−1) bits long. For any i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k}
and any j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , R/s}, we define pij,0(Xi) to
be the all zero string 0s/(t−1) of length s/(t− 1).
Construction 4. Let s be a fixed integer such
that s | R. Let t be a fixed integer such that
(t− 1) | s. Let n = t(R/s). Suppose there are n
servers. Each server will store just ks bits.
• Index the t(R/s) servers by pairs (u, r),
where 1 ≤ r ≤ t and where 1 ≤ u ≤ R/s.
Server S(u,r) stores the uth sub-block of ev-
ery block. So S(u,r) stores piu,j(Xi) where
1 ≤ i ≤ k and 1 ≤ j ≤ t− 1. Note that each
server stores k(t− 1)s/(t− 1) = ks bits.
• A user who requires Record ` chooses k ele-
ments a1, a2, . . . , ak ∈ Zt uniformly and in-
dependently at random. The server S(k,r) is
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sent the query qr = (b1r, b2r, . . . , bkr) ∈ Zkt ,
where
bir =
{
ai + r mod n if i = `,
ai otherwise.
(Note that many servers receive the same
query.)
• Server S(u,r) returns the s/(t− 1)-bit string
c(u,r) = ⊕ki=1piu,bir(Xi).
• To recover the jth sub-block of the uth block
of X`, the user finds integers r and r
′ such
that b`r = 0 and b`r′ = j and computes
c(u,r) ⊕ c(u,r′).
Theorem 3.4. Construction 4 is a PIR scheme
with download complexity Rs
r
t−1s =
t
t−1R.
The scheme has upload complexity nk log t =
(tkR/s) log t and total storage nks = tkR bits.
Proof. As in the proofs of Theorems 3.2 and 3.3,
privacy follows since Su,r always receives a uni-
formly distributed vector qr ∈ Zkt as a query. For
correctness, observe that when i 6= `
piu,bir(Xi)⊕ piu,bir′ (Xi) = piu,ai(Xi)⊕ piu,ai(Xi)
= 0s/(t−1),
but when i = `
piu,bir(Xi)⊕ piu,bir′ (Xi) = piu,0(Xi)⊕ piu,j(Xi)
= piu,j(Xi) = piu,j(X`).
Hence
c(u,r) ⊕ c(u,r′) =
k⊕
i=1
(piu,bir(Xi)⊕ piu,bir′ (Xi))
= piu,j(X`).
So the user can indeed compute the j-th sub-
block of the u-th block as claimed.
It is easy to calculate the upload complex-
ity, download complexity and total storage
complexity as before, remembering that each
server stores ks bits rather than the entire
database.
By fixing t and s to be sufficiently large inte-
gers, we can see that for all positive  we have a
family of schemes with download complexity at
most (1 + )R, with total storage linear in the
database size, with a linear (in R) number of
servers, and where the per server storage is in-
dependent of R. So this family of schemes has a
better download complexity and per-server stor-
age than Shah et al. [38, Section V], and is com-
parable in terms of both the number of servers
and total storage.
The servers may be divided into t classes
S1,S2, . . . ,St, where
Sr = {S(1,r), S(2,r), . . . , S(R/s,r)}.
Since servers in the same class receive the same
query, the above construction still works if some
of the servers within a class are merged. If this
is done, the storage requirements of each merged
server is increased, the download complexity and
total storage are unaffected, and the number of
servers required and upload complexity are re-
duced. So various trade-offs are possible using
this technique.
3.4 An explicit asymptotically opti-
mal scheme
Sun and Jafar [45] describe a PIR scheme that
has the best possible asymptotic download com-
plexity, as R→∞. Their scheme is constructed
in a recursive fashion. In this subsection, we de-
scribe an explicit, non-recursive, scheme with the
same parameters as the Sun and Jafar scheme.
Our scheme has the advantages of a more com-
pact description, and (we believe) a proof that is
significantly more transparent.
Our scheme is described in detail in Construc-
tion 5 below. But, to aid understanding, we first
provide an overview of the scheme.
Suppose that nk divides R. We split an R-
bit string X into nk blocks, each of length R/nk.
For j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , nk} we write pij(X) for the j-th
block of X, and we write pi0(X) for the all zero
block 0R/n
k
.
15
Let V be the set of all non-zero strings v =
v1v2v3 . . . vk ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , n − 1}k such that∑k
i=1 vi ≡ 0 mod n − 1. (Note that our sum
is taken modulo n − 1, not modulo n.) Let
W = {1, 2, . . . , n} × V. For each record, say
Record `, we will define a graph Γ[`] on the vertex
set W (see below).
There are n servers in the scheme, each storing
the whole database. Server Sr receives a query
consisting of integers bi(r,v) ∈ {1, 2, . . . , nk}
where i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k} and v ∈ V. The server
replies with |V| strings, each of length R/nk.
Each string is a linear combination of blocks,
at most one block from each record (the choice
of each block being determined by an integer
bi(r,v): see (4) below). From the perspective of
Sr, the distribution of the integers bi(r,v) does
not depend on `, enabling us to attain privacy.
However, the user chooses these integers so that
bi(r,v) and bi(r
′,v′) are constrained to be equal
when (r,v) and (r′,v′) lie in the same compo-
nent of the graph Γ[`]. This is done in such a
way that the user can reconstruct Record ` from
the servers’ replies.
We now give details of the scheme. We be-
gin by describing the graph Γ[`] (see Figure 1)
and by detailing some of its structure. Let
` ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k}. The graph Γ[`] is defined on
the vertex setW, and is bipartite with partsW [`]1
and W [`]2 : the set W [`]1 consists of those elements
(r,v) ∈ W such that v` 6= 0, and W [`]2 consists
of those elements such that v` = 0. We draw at
most one edge from each element (r,v) ∈ W [`]1
intoW [`]2 as follows. If v` is the only non-zero en-
try in v, we draw no edge from (r, v`), so we have
an isolated vertex. Suppose two or more entries
of v are non-zero. We define `2 ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k} to
be the next entry in v after the `th that is non-
zero, taken cyclically. Let w ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n − 1}
be such that w ≡ v` + v`2 mod n − 1. Define
v′ = v′1v′2 · · · v′k by
v′i =

vi if i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k} \ {`, `2},
0 if i = `,
w if i = `2.
Let r′ ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} be such that r′ ≡ r+v` mod
n. We join (r,v) to (r′,v′).
Let C[`] be the set of connected components of
the graph Γ[`]. We note that Γ[`] has exactly n
isolated vertices, namely the vectors of the form
(r,v) where r ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} and where v is the
single vector defined by
vi =
{
0 if i 6= `,
n− 1 if i = `.
The remaining components in C[`] are stars con-
sisting of a central vertex inW [`]2 and n−1 other
vertices all lying inW [`]1 . Moreover, we note that
if (r,v) and (r′,v′) are distinct vertices in the
same component of Γ[`] then r 6= r′.
We claim that the number of vertices (r,v) ∈
W [`]1 is nk. To see this, we note that there
are n choices for r, and then nk−1 choices for
v1, v2, . . . , v`−1, v`+1, . . . , vk. Once these choices
are made v` ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n − 1} is determined,
since v` 6= 0 and
∑k
i=1 vi ≡ 0 mod n − 1. This
establishes our claim.
Since every component of Γ[`] contains a vertex
in W [`]1 , we see that |C[`]| ≤ |W [`]1 | = nk. Indeed,
the number of components of Γ[`] is:
|C[`]| = n+ (|W [`]1 | − n)/(n− 1)
= n(1 + (nk−1 − 1)/(n− 1)).
Construction 5. Suppose that nk | R. Sup-
pose there are n servers, each storing the whole
database.
• A user who requires Record ` proceeds as as
follows. In the notation defined above, for
each i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k} \ {`} the user chooses
(uniformly and independently) a random in-
jection fi : C[`] → {1, 2, . . . , nk}. The
user chooses (again uniformly and indepen-
dently) a random bijection ψ : W [`]1 →
{1, 2, . . . , nk}.
Define integers bi(r,v) ∈ {0, 1, . . . , nk} for
(r,v) ∈ W and i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k} as follows.
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(1, 101)
(3, 202)
(2, 002)
(1, 110)
(3, 220)
(2, 020)
(1, 112)
(3, 222)
(2, 022)
(1, 211)
(2, 121)
(3, 011)
(2, 211)
(3, 121)
(1, 011)
(1, 200)
...
...
W [`]1
W [`]2
Figure 1: Part of the graph Γ[`] when n = k = 3 and ` = 1.
If i 6= `, define
bi(r,v) =

0 if vi = 0,
fi(C) if vi 6= 0
and (r,v) lies in the
component C ∈ C.
Note that when i = ` we have that vi 6= 0 if
and only if (r,v) ∈ W [`]1 . So when i = ` we
may define
bi(r,v) =
{
0 if vi = 0,
ψ((r,v)) if vi 6= 0.
For r = 1, 2, . . . , n, server Sr is sent the vec-
tor qr = (bi(r,v) : v ∈ V, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k}).
• The server Sr replies with the blocks
s(r,v) =
k∑
i=1
pibi(r,v)(Xi) (4)
for all v ∈ V.
• To recover block j of X`, the user finds
(r,v) = ψ−1(j) ∈ W [`]1 . Let C ∈ C[`] be
the component containing (r,v). If |C| > 1,
let (r′,v′) ∈ C ∩ W [`]2 . Then (see below for
justification)
pij(X`) =
{
s(r,v) if |C| = 1, and
s(r,v) ⊕ s(r′,v′) if |C| > 1.
Theorem 3.5. Construction 5 is an n-server
PIR scheme with download complexity (1 −
1/nk)(n/(n − 1))R. The total storage of the
scheme is nkR. The upload complexity of the
scheme is k2nk log n bits.
Proof. We begin by establishing correctness of
the scheme. Let (r,v) = ψ−1(j) and let C ∈ C[`]
be the component containing (r,v). When |C| =
1 we have vi 6= 0 if and only if i = ` and so
s(r,v) =
k∑
i=1
pibi(r,v)(Xi) = pib`(r,v)(X`) = pij(X`),
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the last equality following since b`(r,v) = j.
Hence the user recovers the jth block pij(X`)
of X` correctly in this case. Suppose now that
C contains two or more vertices, so there exists
(r′,v′) ∈ C ∩ W [`]2 . When i 6= `, the values of
bi(r,v) and bi(r
′,v′) are equal, since (r,v) and
(r′,v′) lie in the same component C of Γ[`] and
since vi = 0 if and only if v
′
i = 0. Moreover,
v` 6= 0 and v′` = 0. Hence
s(r,v) ⊕ s(r′,v′) =
k∑
i=1
(
pibi(r,v)(Xi)⊕ pibi(r′,v′)(Xi)
)
= pib`(r,v)(X`)⊕ pib`(r′,v′)(X`))
= piψ((r,v))(X`)⊕ pi0(X`))
= pij(X`).
So the user recovers the jth block pij(X`) of X`
correctly in this case also. We have established
correctness.
We now aim to establish the security of the
scheme. Let A be the set of integer vectors
(ai(v) ∈ {0, 1, . . . , nk} : i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k},v ∈ V)
with the restrictions that ai(v) = 0 if and only
if vi = 0, and that for any fixed i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k}
the integers ai(v) with vi 6= 0 are distinct. Let
r ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} be fixed. The query qr =
(bi(r,v) : v ∈ V, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k}) lies in A, since
the functions fi and ψ are injective and since
(whether or not i = `) we have bi(r,v) = 0 if
and only if vi = 0. Indeed, the query is uni-
formly distributed in A. To see this, first note
that the functions fi (for i 6= `) and ψ are cho-
sen independently. The values b`(r,v) for v` 6= 0
are uniform subject to being distinct since ψ is a
randomly chosen bijection. For i 6= `, the values
bi(r,v) for v` 6= 0 are uniform subject to being
distinct, since fi is a uniformly chosen injection
from C[`], and since at most one vertex in any
component C ∈ C[`] has its first entry equal to r.
Hence the distribution of query qr is uniform on
A as claimed. Since this distribution does not
depend on `, privacy follows.
Each server replies with |V| strings, each string
of length R/nk. Since there are n servers, the
download complexity is nR|V|/nk. So it remains
to determine |V|. For 0 ≤ s ≤ k − 1, there
are nk−s−1 elements v1v2 · · · vk ∈ V that be-
gin with exactly s zeros, since we may choose
vs+2, vs+3, . . . , vk ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n − 1} arbitrarily
and then vs+1 is determined by the fact it is non-
zero and
∑k
j=1 vj ≡ 0 mod n− 1. So
|V| =
k−1∑
s=0
nk−s−1 = (nk − 1)/(n− 1)
and the download complexity is (1 −
1/nk)(n/(n− 1))R, as required.
We may argue that the total upload com-
plexity is k2nk log n as follows. Consider Server
Sr. The integers bi(r,v) with vi = 0 are zero,
and so do not need to be sent. There are ex-
actly knk−1 integers bi(r,v) ∈ {1, 2, . . . , nk} with
i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k} and v ∈ V with vi 6= 0. (To
see this, note that there are k choices for i, and
n choices for each component v except the `th.
But then v` is determined by the fact that it
is non-zero and
∑k
j=1 vj ≡ 0 mod n − 1.) Each
integer can be specified using k log n bits, and
so the query qr is k
2nk−1 log n bits long. Since
there are n servers, the total upload complexity
is k2nk log n bits, as required.
3.5 An averaging technique
The download complexity of both the PIR
scheme due to Sun and Jafar [45] and the scheme
in Construction 5 above is (1 − 1/nk)(n/(n −
1))R. This is only slightly smaller than the more
practical scheme in Construction 3, which has
download complexity (n/(n− 1))R. In fact, the
expected number of bits downloaded in Construc-
tion 3 is (1−1/nk)(n/(n−1))R, since a server is
asked for an all-zero linear combination of blocks
with probability 1/nk and need not reply in this
case. This section describes an ‘averaging’ tech-
nique which transforms Construction 3 into a
scheme with good (worst case) download com-
plexity, at the price of a much stronger divisi-
bility constraint on the length of blocks. This
technique will work for a wide range of PIR
schemes, but in the case of Construction 3 it
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produces a scheme with optimal download com-
plexity (1 − 1/nk)(n/(n − 1))R. Moreover, the
upload complexity is considerably smaller than
the schemes described in [45] and Construction 5.
Before giving the detail, we describe the gen-
eral idea. Chan, Ho and Yamamoto [12, Re-
mark 3], [13, Remark 2] observed that a PIR
scheme with good upload complexity (but long
record lengths) can be constructed by dividing
each record into blocks, then using copies of a
fixed PIR scheme for shorter records operating
on each block in parallel. Crucially, the same
randomness (and so the same queries) can be
used for each parallel copy of the scheme, and
so upload complexity is low. The ‘averaging’
construction operates in a similar way. How-
ever, rather than using the same randomness we
use different but predictably varying randomness
for each parallel copy. The server can calculate
queries for each copy of the scheme from just one
query, so upload complexity remains low. But
(because queries vary over all possibilities) the
resulting scheme has (worst case) download com-
plexity equal to the average number of bits of
download in the Chan, Ho and Yamamoto con-
struction.
In more detail, we modify Construction 3 as
follows. Suppose that nk(n − 1) | R. We divide
an R-bit string X into nk(n − 1) blocks, each
of size R/(nk(n − 1)). We index these blocks
by pairs (b,x) where b ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n − 1} ⊆ Zn
and x ∈ Zkn. We write pi(b,x)(X) for the block of
X that is indexed by (b,x). For any x ∈ Zkn, we
write pi(0,x)(X) for the all-zero string 0
R/(nk(n−1))
of length R/(nk(n− 1)).
Construction 6. Let n be an integer such that
nk(n− 1) | R. Suppose there are n servers, each
storing the entire database.
• A user who requires Record ` chooses k
elements a1, a2, . . . , ak ∈ Zn uniformly
and independently at random. For r =
1, . . . , n, server Sr is sent the vector qr =
(b1r, b2r, . . . , bkr) ∈ Zkn, where
bir =
{
ai + r mod n if i = `,
ai otherwise.
• For r ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} and x ∈ Zkn, define the
string c(r,x) of length R/(n
k(n− 1)) by
c(r,x) =
k⊕
i=1
pi(bir+xi,x)(Xi).
The server Sr returns the string c(r,x), for
all x = (x1, x2, . . . , xk) ∈ Zkn such that x +
qr 6= 0. So Sr returns nk − 1 strings.
• To recover the block of X` indexed by a pair
(j,x), the user finds the integers r and r′
such that b`r+x` = 0 and b`r′+x` = j. The
user then computes c(r,x) ⊕ c(r′,x).
Theorem 3.6. Construction 6 is an n-server
PIR scheme with download complexity (1 −
1/nk) nn−1R. The scheme has upload complexity
nk log n and total storage is nkR.
Proof. We begin with the correctness of the
scheme. Exactly as in the proof of Theorem 3.3,
we note that r and r′ exist since b`r + x` ∈
{0, 1, 2 . . . , n − 1} takes on each possible value
once as r ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n} varies. Moreover, we
note that the string c(r,x) is all zero if x + qr = 0
(and similarly the string c(r′,x) is all zero if
x + qr′ = 0) and so the user always receives
enough information to calculate c(r,x) ⊕ c(r′,x).
Let x = (x1, x2, . . . , xk). When i 6= `,
pi(bir+xi,x)(Xi)⊕ pi(bir′+xi,x)(Xi)
= pi(ai+xi,x)(Xi)⊕ pi(ai+xi,x)(Xi)
= 0R/(n−1).
When i = `,
pi(bir+xi,x)(Xi)⊕ pi(bir′+xi,x)(Xi)
= pi(0,x)(Xi)⊕ pi(j,x)(Xi)
= pi(j,x)(Xi) = pi(j,x)(X`).
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Hence
c(r,x) ⊕ c(r′,x)
=
k⊕
i=1
(pi(bir+xi,x)(Xi)⊕ pi(bir′+xi,x)(Xi))
= pi(j,x)(X`).
So the user recovers the block of X` indexed by
(j,x) correctly.
Privacy follows from the privacy of Construc-
tion 3, as the method for generating queries is
identical.
The total storage is nkR, since each of n
servers stores the entire kR-bit database. Each
query qr is kdlog ne bits long, since an element of
Zn may be specified using log n bits. Hence the
upload complexity is nk log n. Since there are n
servers, and each server returns nk− 1 strings of
length R/(nk(n − 1)), the download complexity
is (1− 1/nk) nn−1R.
4 Conclusions and future work
In this paper, we have used classical PIR tech-
niques to prove bounds on the download com-
plexity of PIR schemes in modern models, and
we have presented various constructions for PIR
schemes which are either simpler or perform bet-
ter than previously known schemes. The char-
acteristics of the six constructions in this paper
are summarised in Fig 2, and parameters for the
schemes in [38] and [39] are included for compar-
ison.
Various interesting problems remain in this
area. We first consider schemes with optimal
download complexity:
Question 1. Are there PIR schemes with fewer
than R+ 1 bits of download complexity?
Our paper, like the rest of the literature, only
considers PIR schemes over binary channels, and
in this model the answer is ‘no’. But the proofs
of this fact in this paper and in Shah at el. [38]
both use the fact that we are working over binary
channels: more than R bits of download implies
that at least R+ 1 bits are downloaded. So this
problem is still open if we extend the model to
schemes that do not necessarily use binary chan-
nels.
We now return to the standard binary channel
model.
Question 2. Are there PIR schemes with down-
load complexity R+ 1 and total storage linear in
R?
This result was claimed in Shah at el. [38], but
we believe that a proof of this is still not known.
A proof of this result might depend on a more
detailed structural analysis of PIR schemes with
R+1 bits of download. As a first step, we believe
the following to be of interest:
Question 3. Theorem 2.7 bounds the probability
that only R bits are downloaded in a PIR scheme
with (worst case) download complexity R+ 1. Is
this bound tight?
We conjecture that the bound could be signif-
icantly improved in some cases.
We now consider families of schemes that have
good asymptotic complexity as R→∞.
Question 4. Does there exist a family of
schemes with download complexity (1 + o(R))R
and linear total storage?
Note that an affirmative solution to Question 2
will imply an affirmative solution to this ques-
tion.
Question 5. Are there practical PIR schemes
that approach asymptotic capacity as R grows?
The schemes by Sun and Jafar [39] and the
related schemes presented in this paper have the
strong restriction that nk must divide R.
Question 6. Is there a combinatorial proof that
provides a tight upper bound on the asymptotic
capacity as R→∞?
We comment that the proof in Sun and Ja-
far [39] uses information theoretic techniques. A
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Download Upload Restrictions Comments
[38] R+ 1 R(R+ 1) n = (R− 1)k Algorithm 1 and 2 in [38]
[38] R+ 1 k(R+ 1) log(R+ 1) n = R+ 1 End of [38, Sec. IV]
[38] (2∆/(∆− (k − 1)))R (∆2/(∆− (k − 1)))R n ≥ 2∆, ∆ ≥ 2k Algorithm 3 in [38]; linear storage
[39] (1− 1/nk)(n/(n− 1)R k2nk logn nk|R Optimal asymptotic download; recursive
1 R+ 1 kR(R+ 1) n = R+ 1 Generalisation of [14]
2 R+ 1 k(R+ 1) log(R+ 1) n = R+ 1 Similar to [38, Sect. IV]; improved expected download
3 n
n−1R nk logn (n− 1)|R Optimal download for n servers
4 t
t−1R nk log t s|R, (t− 1)|s, n = tR/s Each server stores only ks bits
5 (1− 1/nk)(n/(n− 1)R k2nk logn nk|R Optimal asymptotic download; non-recursive
6 (1− 1/nk)(n/(n− 1)R nk logn nk(n− 1)|R Optimal asymptotic download; improved upload
Figure 2: Summary of the six constructions in this paper and those in [38, 39]
combinatorial proof might give extra structural
information for schemes meeting the bound, and
might improve the bound in non-asymptotic
cases.
Finally, we turn to larger questions. It is
clearly very important to construct schemes with
practical parameter sizes, which can work in real-
life distributed storage settings. In particular,
the following problems are key.
Question 7. Can we find better constructions
for PIR schemes?
Schemes are of interest if they improve per
server storage, total storage, upload or download
complexity, if the number of servers needed was
reduced, or if the divisibility conditions for pa-
rameters such as R are weakened.
Question 8. Can the techniques from this paper
be applied to establish bounds or give construc-
tions in other models, such as those discussed in
Subsection 1.3?
In particular, can these constructions be
adapted to work when the database is coded (in
order to provide robustness against server fail-
ure, for example)?
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